



APPROACHES TO CIVIL WARS: ‘HOW DO LEADERS LEAD, AND WHY DO FOLLOWERS FOLLOW?’*

Pizwak Imtiaz**

Department of Political Science, Central European University, Hungary

ABSTRACT

This paper analyses the theories of civil wars as envisioned by three civil war theories presented by Stathis Kalivas (2000, 2009), Michael Brown (1996) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). The paper begins with the definitions and typology of civil wars, as envisioned by the three theories and highlights possible points of convergence among the three, in terms of the causes and process of civil war onset. Further, it comments upon individual nuances of the theories, and criticizes common aspects to present a comparative framework regarding theories of civil wars. The argument favours a systematic understanding of civil wars as presented by Stathis Kalyvas, through a thorough depiction of his structural and multifaceted understanding of the causes of civil war, based on the idea of violence. Although Brown’s contribution regarding the permissive and proximate causes of civil wars is critical towards distinguishing catalysts from underlying causes of civil wars, his reliance on elite-centred theories has been criticized. Fearon and Laitin’s empirical analysis although invaluable towards dispelling the centrality given to ethnic and religious diversity earlier, lacks in an understanding of what leads to actual violence. Towards the end, a more interpretative form of research is required to see how several factors cause internal conflict and are also endogenous and interconnected with the actors (government, insurgents, civilians), to understand the persistence of different forms of violence in civil wars.

Keywords: Civil war, internal conflict, violence, theories of civil war

* Borrowed from Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (1985).

** Author e-mail
pizwak@gmail.com

©2016 Social Affairs Journal. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

INTRODUCTION

Civil wars are arguably one of the most important events that have shaped human history. From the American civil war to the post-cold war internal wars, civil wars continue

to shape and reshape history, throwing into relief the timeless importance of it. This paper analyses some theories of civil wars as envisioned by four civil war theorists namely Stathis Kalivas (2006; 2007), Michael Brown (1996) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). The paper highlights possible points of convergence among the three theories in terms of the causes and process of civil war onset. Further, the paper highlights the individual nuances of the theories with a special focus on individual unique factors, collective nuances, and criticisms levelled against said theories in order to present them within a comparative framework.

MICHAEL BROWN:

Michael Brown is the Dean of Elliot School of International Affairs and Professor of International Affairs at the George Washington University, and is an eminent scholar and authority on the subject of internal ethnic conflicts and civil wars. His notable works include *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict* (1997), *The International Dimension of Internal Conflict* (1996), and *Do Democracies Win their Wars?* (2011).

Brown (1996) focuses on the causes of civil wars, defining them as 'internal conflicts' that rely on elites and international agents for perpetuation. He concentrates on the causes of civil wars, introducing an in-depth analysis of possible causes and catalysts of internal conflict that range from self-centred elites to international interventions. His work therefore is a notable contribution that dispels the ethno-centric and cultural approach that ascribe ethnic conflicts to 'historical grievances'¹, and is a step towards understanding the underlying complexities of such conflicts. Brown evaluates a number of systematic causes that lead to ethnic conflict, dividing them majorly into permissive (existing cleavages) and proximate causes. The major proximate causes as underlined by Brown include the existence of two ethnic

groups in proximity to each other, and a weak institutional structure unable to contain their mutual conflict. Brown's theory of civil wars, its reliance on elite-centred approaches which lay the pressure of initiation on domestic and foreign elites, and other aspects will be critically evaluated in the following sections.

JAMES FEARON AND DAVID LAITIN:

James Fearon, professor at the Stanford University's School of Humanities and Sciences, is renowned for his expertise in the field of armed conflict and political violence, especially in quantitative analysis. Some of his recent works focus on civil wars caused by violent interactions between locals and economic migrants², and works on the Iraqi civil war³. David Laitin is professor of Political Science at Stanford University, with an interest in comparative politics, ethnic conflict and civil wars. Notable works by Laitin include *Nation, States and Violence* (2007), and *Hegemony and Culture: The Politics of Religious Change Among the Yoruba* (1986) among others.

In their seminal work "Ethnicity, Insurgency and civil wars" (2003), Fearon and Laitin use quantitative study using large-N⁴ technique to determine the causes of civil wars with the use of economic and structural causes, dispelling the earlier practice of considering ethnic and religious diversity as factors leading to the onset of war. Through a quantitative analysis in which civil war onset is treated as the dependent variable, they reach the conclusion that weak state power (indicated by less per capita income), rough terrains, and access to weapons are factors that cause civil wars, whereas grievances such as ethnic diversity and discrimination are weakly correlated with civil war onset.

STATHIS KALYVAS:

Stathis Kalyvas, professor of Political Science at Yale University directs the program on

Order, Conflict and Violence. His interest lies in various forms of conflict, and his recent works include: *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (2006), *Order, Conflict & Violence* (2008) and *Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars* (with Laia Balcells, 2014).

In his understanding of civil wars, Kalyvas pays special attention to the culmination of 'violence'. He employs a mix method by combining a quantitative large-N study and ethnographic research to determine how violence perpetuates in wars, and determines the differences among civil wars through differences in military conflict in different regions. He contends that since the establishment of actual causal mechanisms is a complex task, it is better to understand the process of civil war onset through the propagation of violence. He reaches the conclusion that ethnic allegiances play no role in the event of actual conflict, and therefore belonging to a certain ethnic group does not necessitate participation in and support of the conflict; people are more concerned with their personal safety and economic interests, which might be more of an incentive for them to support one side over the other.

The following section engages with each theory of civil wars in greater depth, analysing their nuances and commenting on the validity of each in their own realm, and in comparison with the others.

CRITICISMS

Brown uses civil wars interchangeably with internal conflicts – taking governments and rebel groups as key agents of the conflict – which is caused by domestic factors within the boundary of a state. His emphasis on the 'international aspect of civil wars' and its resulting regional instability is what distinguishes him from other theorists under discussion (Brown 1996). Brown's definition allows a wider range of conflicts to

be included in the ambit of internal conflict, including terrorism, armed ethnic conflict, secessionist movements, revolutions and military coups. In contrast, Fearon and Laitin are not concerned with a definition of civil wars per se, but in terms of explaining what causes them, they introduce the concept of insurgency defined as military conflict characterized by guerilla warfare from rural bases (Fearon and Laitin 2003). They are concerned with dispelling the idea that grievances matter, and link the concept of insurgency to the presence of opportunities for its creation, to explain the process of civil wars. Kalyvas also emphasizes on the concept of combat, and defines civil wars as combats taking place within a sovereign state, "subject to common authority at the outset of hostilities" (Kalyvas 2007; p.417). He explicitly differentiates civil wars from terrorism and communal riots unlike Brown.⁵

MICHAEL BROWN

Michael Brown defines internal wars in terms of their causes rather than the actual process of the war.⁶ In distinguishing between the permissible and proximate causes of internal conflict, he attempts to criticize earlier literature for its inability to pinpoint exact 'catalysts' for the conflict, rather giving a general set of conditions that may lead to such a situation.⁷ In the end, the conclusion gives merit to economic causes and antagonistic group histories as permissive conditions, which allow the condition of proximate causes (elite competition) to emerge.⁸ Therefore it constitutes a multifaceted approach to the study of internal conflicts.

Brown's theory of 'bad actors' and 'bad neighbourhoods' should be credited for giving value to an otherwise value-neutral debate, which he criticizes for being centred around what he calls the 'contagion' and 'spillovers' of conflict from the affected states to its neighbours. Criticizing this simplistic notion of internal conflicts, he emphasizes on

the role of rulers and elites that play an active role in spurring and aiding internal conflict. Furthermore, the typology of international interventions in internal conflicts is a notable way of countering the earlier linear concepts that deem the international actor to be passive in the conflict⁹.

Although Brown's elite-centred theory is useful in so far as it helps highlight the role of opportunistic rulers, one may feel that the over-emphasis on elites does not necessarily warrant the conclusion that they are the primary catalyst in internal wars.¹⁰ This leads one again to the conundrum of determining proximate and permissible causes, as what constitutes 'primary' is a more or less subjective endeavour. The centrality given to the actions of elites assumes the passivity of masses, reducing the study of most civil wars to elite-triggered contests. This is questionable as many civil wars are arguably a combination of elite direction and mass activation. Brown's disregard for the latter therefore can be somewhat problematic. He seems to ignore the structural, ethnic and ideological causes of violence that spread among masses regardless of elite positions.¹¹ This approach also fails to explain the persistence of violence and continuation of civil wars for long periods of time. An over-reliance on elites and leaders might therefore be considered problematic.¹²

JAMES FEARON & DAVID LAITIN

Fearon and Laitin through their article *Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War* make a significant contribution to existing literature by dispelling simplistic notions of ethnicity and religious diversity leading to civil wars. Through a large N quantitative analysis, they reach the conclusion that civil wars emerge out of insurgency, caused and persisted by poverty, weakness of government and political instability. The significance of linking civil war with insurgency is immense as it helps distinguish between open war

and guerrilla warfare, which is most often employed by actors of civil wars.

Fearon and Laitin actively distinguish between 'rebels' who are less in number, the locals who are not involved in the insurgency yet are a part of the resulting violence, and the government as the higher power-holder. This nuanced categorization is very effective as opposed to the image of a nationalist ethnic group waging internal war against the state, because it highlights the complex role and priority of each group based on a model of economic opportunities and political power, without being limited by conventional understandings of wars as mere ethnic rifts. Therefore even in the case of ethnic wars, the category of ethnic fractionalization is insignificant in the multivariate analysis, showing that other factors are more crucial; a concept that has also been supported by Stathis Kalyvas.¹³

The authors identify decolonization as one of the factors which leads to the fragility of states affected with civil wars, which is a prominent contribution in light of the earlier practice of ignoring the effects of colonialism on the post-colonial underdevelopment and political instability.¹⁴ However, their understanding of post-colonial wars does not draw from the concept of discrimination and oppression as proposed by the dependency theory, but rather focuses on the economic consequences of WWII as the reason behind anti-colonial wars and nationalistic movements. According to Fearon and Laitin, the economic costs of WWII weakened the colonial structures that in turn gave rise to grievances because the states had previously functioned rather peacefully with "fairly little active rebellion" (2006; p.86). Creating a structural framework in which ethnic and religious grievances do not seem to be causal factors, they suggest that a systematic creation of fragile states due to the end of colonialism is an important factor contributing

to the creation of internal insurgencies in many of these countries.¹⁵ This concept although significant in understanding the economic repercussions of the WWII, may be at risk of at best ignoring and at worst trivializing the on-going resistance movements and nationalistic struggles by colonial subjects in India and West Africa regardless of their economic conditions, and the impact of such movements on causing internal civil wars.¹⁶

When analysed in terms of determining the catalysts that lead to actual conflict, Fearon and Laitin's analysis falls short. Although they show causes that might increase the likelihood of war, they do not adequately show causes that trigger the conflict.¹⁷ Therefore, we know that fragile states with weak economic structures have a greater propensity to conflict, but the exact trigger points for conflicts cannot be determined amid several factors that the authors have covered in their analysis. Their disregard for a need to identify underlying causes that drives them, and reliance on just the presence of the opportunity in terms of weak state structure, might be a reason why the authors seem only to discuss factors that might increase the likelihood of war, but do not pinpoint exact causal mechanisms. This might also be considered a critique of their disregard for considering grievances as causes. They state that since there are only a few rebels that actually perpetuate the conflict, there is little need to consider the average grievances prevalent in the society if at all.

Fearon and Laitin's exhaustive quantitative survey leads to a large-N analysis, but may be criticized for its disregard for nuances. The reduction of a complex process of civil wars to a quantitative analysis may hold the risk of losing important details when it comes to the layers of reasons that might be at play at the same time and trigger the conflict.¹⁸ The usage of a statistical proxy¹⁹ for determining

factors such as ethnic fractionalization, linguistic divide (civil liberties), state power (per capita income) and political inability (lack of peripheral hold, foreign aid) may not fully capture the actual events, and therefore from an interpretivist perspective might not be an effective way to delve deeply into the causes of civil war onset.²⁰ Furthermore, it might be that the measure of ethnic fractionalization is insignificant for establishing causality, but certain other measures related to ethnic diversity are significant.²¹

STATHIS KALYVAS

While Brown contents himself with the complex classification of the origin of civil wars, Kalyvas not only distinguishes between the different causes of the wars, but also looks in detail at the actual process and permeation of the conflict, taking into account the locality, the violence and the outcomes of the conflict to an extent.

Kalyvas's most striking contributions to the literature on civil wars are his centrality of violence and the complete denunciation of elite politics, describing individual participants as 'opportunistic' rather than driven by any ideology. Whereas one is not convinced by Brown's over-emphasis on elite-centered politics, Kalyvas's utter rejection of the role of ideology and crude picture of real politic also is somewhat baffling. He attempts to narrate a parallel image of the study of civil wars, where the role of historical or situational (colonial, etc.) cleavages and ideological affiliations are not enough to explain the actual culmination into war, as these factors can be endogenous to the actual outcome.²² Emphasizing on the 'civil' aspect of the terminology, Kalyvas stresses the importance of masses rather than elites, going so far as to state that the access to civilians, and who they are loyal to is an important method of establishing a singular means of coercion, and therefore strategic alliances would be at play at both ends.²³ This is a better analysis as

it provides an active critique of the greed and grievance structure, whereby only economic failure and political grievances cannot lead to civil war, but a mixture of features and 'opportunities' (weak states) need to exist for conflicts to occur.²⁴ However, though he counters the over-reliance on ideology, the total disregard for existing cleavages is not warranted. Although it might be that the ideological aspect holds less and less value as conflict worsens or the level of violence increases, the idea that cleavages exist and should not be utterly discarded also remains true.²⁵

The treatment of violence, not just as an end of the civil war, but also the means in itself is Kalyvas's most striking contribution to the literature on civil wars. He introduces a typology much more nuanced in terms of the usage of violence, the nature and type of violence being employed and the actors and variance of tactics among them.²⁶ By bringing the idea of violence to centre stage, he attempts to explain the 'logic' that brings about such atrocities. Whereas scholars such as Charles Tilly (2006) have dealt with the effect and contribution of violence in internal conflicts such as revolutions and civil wars,²⁷ Kalyvas recognizes the limitation of the earlier causal mechanisms based on origin and relies on dimensions of warfare to illustrate the process of violence and nuances among civil wars. He discusses the complexity of distinguishing between ethnic and religious wars, stating that a layer of factors may be at play. He makes a distinction between process and forms of militarization using state implosion and challenges to state authority (in cases of multiple sovereigns) as factors leading to civil war and the resulting forms of violence.

Kalyvas relies on quantitative methods to determine the dependent and independent factors that affect civil wars. He later makes use of ethnographic data from the Greek civil

war to contend the dominance of selective violence over indiscriminate violence, and the dominance of 'opportunistic' forms of violence over ideology-driven actions. What is methodologically problematic is the expansion of this technique towards the theoretical understanding of civil wars in general.²⁸ His utter disregard for the individual's ideological and ethnic sensitivities reduces the utility of the concept in analysing civil wars, and thus may miss the all-encompassing nature that he claims to achieve.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has analysed some theories of civil wars as envisioned by four civil war theorists namely Stathis Kalivas (2006; 2007), Michael Brown (1996) and Fearon and Laitin (2003). By reflecting on the time frame that the three authors are writing in, this paper has attempted to establish that a change in trends of understanding civil wars can be seen, from ethnic, ideology-based and elite level explanations (Brown) to more structural and state-level explanations (with the inclusion of actual combat type, violence type and creation of multiple sovereignty) along quantitative lines (Kalyvas, Fearon & Laitin).

All three theorists should be applauded for their multi-faceted approaches towards the understanding of civil wars. Albeit different, all three tend to dispel earlier notions of linearity and simplistic understanding, and this is a major credit to their research. As a result, the scope of understanding civil wars has broadened as more factors are studied. However, an over-reliance on economic derivatives in the quantitative analysis (Kalyvas, Fearon & Laitin) has been criticized.

In conclusion, all three theorists have developed a distinct yet multifaceted approach towards the understanding of civil wars. Although Brown's contribution regarding the permissive and proximate causes of civil wars

is critical towards distinguishing catalysts from underlying causes of civil wars and introducing the international aspect of the war, his complete reliance on elite-centred theories is not warranted. Fearon and Laitin's empirical analysis although invaluable towards dispelling the centrality given to ethnic and religious diversity earlier, lacks an understanding of what leads to actual violence. The approach of understanding violence as an understanding of the onset of civil wars (Kalyvas) is considered to be the most useful, as a nuanced description of structural causes through a macro and micro-level analysis is an effective way to both analyse and interpret actual civil war processes. However, a more interpretative form of research is required to see how several factors cause internal conflict and are also endogenous to and interconnected with the actors (government, insurgents, civilians) of civil wars, in order to understand the persistence of civil wars themselves as well as different forms of violence in them.

NOTES

1. Historically, civil war research had focused on causes based on historical grievances, pinning them on ethnic and religious diversity as the source of warfare. See Huntington (1996) and Horowitz (1985) on the connection between plural societies and the likelihood of violence. However, later researchers reject this simplistic understanding of conflicts, bringing in complex understandings of the causes of civil wars. The 'greed' model also emerges through this rejection, whereby the concepts of resource curse (African countries), economic deprivations and global economic interests were seen to play major roles in spurring ethnic conflicts in regions previously peaceful. For more on the greed model, see Collier & Hoeffler (2004). For more complex understandings of the causes involving both greed and grievance, see Keen (2000).
2. See Fearon, J.D. and D. Laitin. (2011). Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War, *World Development, Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife*, 39(2), pp.199–211. DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.031.
3. See Fearon, J.D. (2007). Iraq's Civil War, *Foreign Affairs*, 86(2), pp.2–15.
4. Large-N research technique employs a range of cases to quantitatively analyze a given phenomenon, through comparison across a range of factors. Although useful for large-scale comparisons and generalizations, it is criticized for ignoring heterogeneity among cases and underlying nuances as opposed to small-N qualitative studies that understand phenomenon across few selected cases with sensitivity to basic nuances and individual uniqueness. See Neuman (2007) for a comparison of quantitative and qualitative methods.
5. Definitional problems for the characterization of civil wars is an important complexity in studying civil wars, as it includes a variation of internal actions from genocide to military coups. It is often seen that countries avoid using the term for fear of international retaliation in cases of internal violence. They would therefore avoid using the term even in cases of secessionist movements that affect a considerable population. The case of Baluchistan in Pakistan (1973) is an example, whereby the government refuses to declare it as a civil war despite over 7500 people being killed. There is, however, a consensus of declaring a conflict as a civil war if the number of deaths is in excess of 1000.
6. Unlike Kalyvas, who focuses on the process, and Tilly, who focuses on the outcomes of civil wars.
7. The increased emphasis on problem-solving in terms of plausible actions by the international community should indicate why such a simplistic explanation has been considered for such a complex phenomenon as internal conflicts (i.e. the need for quick and easy solutions).
8. Although post-colonial countries could serve as examples of weakly structured (political divides, group antagonisms, etc.) and economically undeveloped countries, the author does not include colonial wars in the analysis to understand these factors and their effect on the culmination of war.
9. Brown categorizes two ways of understanding the regional dimension of internal wars. The first involves the effects of internal wars on neighbouring states which results in refugee problems, political instability and economic repercussions. This is the classical 'diffusion effect' concept, which Brown criticizes for being simplistic. The second way of understanding the international dimension of internal wars and the one more important to Brown is the actions that international actors (countries and elites both)

take with respect to these conflicts. He helpfully categorizes the types of these interventions as humanitarian interventions (aimed at delivering aid), defensive interventions (safeguarding national security by avoiding contagion of ethnic conflict), and opportunistic interventions (aimed at furthering their own political interests by spurring conflict in the country). See Brown (1996, p.25) for further information.

10. Although not generalizable in all contexts, elite triggered conflicts do hold true for certain developing countries, such as the case of Rwanda in 1990, where the Hutu political elite played a major if not the most important role in instigating the genocide against Tutsis.

11. See Skocpol (1979) for limitations in over-reliance on elites and ideology as change-bearers in society.

12. Kalyvas's reliance on violence and war might be a better explanation for the persistence of war, and the longer duration of wars post-WWII, owing to the increase in militarization weapons and techniques.

13. Kalyvas also discusses this when determining the causes and outcomes of violence in guerilla insurgency in rural areas.

14. See Andre Gunder Frank (1966), *The Development of Underdevelopment*, England: New England Free Press for dependency theory and how it is ignored in academic circles.

15. Unlike Michael Brown, who does not consider colonial wars in his analysis due to the resulting complexity related to the colonizers deeming them as mutinies while the colonized wage them as secessionist wars.

16. For information on freedom movements and colonial struggles in British India, see Chandra, B. (1989), *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*, India: Penguin Books. For a nuanced understanding of the range of resistance movements that spurred in response to colonialism in Africa, see Cooper, F. (1994), *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*, *The American Historical Review*, 99(5), pp. 1516–1545. DOI:10.2307/2168387.

17. As opposed to Brown's proximate and permissive causes that distinguish between existing crevices necessary for conflict, and the changing circumstances that trigger it which are both essential for conflict to exist.

18. Sambanis, N. (2002). *A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War, Defence and Peace Economics*, *Defence and Peace Economics*, pp. 215-243; on the need for a

greater integration of micro-level and macro-level causes to determine why civil war erupts, what explains the variation of violence, in addition to the empirical research available.

19. Proxy is a variable that serves in place of an unobserved or immeasurable variable, used here to determine measureable variables in place of immeasurable ones such as political instability (proxy= foreign aid), state power (proxy= per capita income), etc. The validity of a proxy is determined by its level of correlation with the original variable, which has been questioned here.

20. Fearon (2004) finds that the measurement of 'ethnic distance' has to be applied to measure group diversity, and that the correlation of the resulting measurement of ethnic fractionalization using alternate data sources with the existing Ethno-linguistic fractionalization is very high.

21. For a comparison between Ethnic Polarization and Ethnic Fractionalization, see Montalvo, J.G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005), *Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars*. Based on the notion of Horowitz (1985) that ethnic insurgency will be low in countries with high ethnic homogeneity and those with high ethnic heterogeneity, they claim that ethnic polarization instead of ethnic fractionalization is a better measure of the likelihood of conflict. The empirical analysis shows that there is indeed a significant effect of ethnic polarization on conflict, hence proving that it is a better measure of causality.

22. See Kalyvas (2007): "The salience of ethnicity and the animosity between ethnic groups may be an outcome of the conflict rather than its cause" (p. 420).

23. Also stated by Fearon and Laitin (2003) in their discussion on ethnic insurgency: "The presence of an ethnic insurgency does not imply that the members of the ethnic group are of one mind... The immediate concern is how to survive in between government forces and insurgents, both of which use violence to defeat the other" (p. 80).

24. See Nicholas Sambanis (2004), *Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War*, *Perspectives on Politics* for a critique on the simplistic greed and grievance model and a need for an analysis of different forms of violence that arise within conflicts.

25. See Thaler, K.M. (2012). *Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola*, *Civil Wars*, p. 550: on the erosion of ideology as a war progresses and the subsequent increase in violence as a result.

26. Kalyvas (2006): Distinction between 'indiscriminate' and 'selective' violence. Since access to civilians is key, both insurgents and the state will shift from indiscriminate to selective forms of violence to gain support. Kalyvas links inherent grievances and geographical location to the types of violence that the actors employ (state vs. insurgents), reaching the conclusion that i) Geographical location trumps pre-war grievances, and ii) Ethnicity is not always the defining factor in allegiances during the onset of civil wars.

27. Tilly's typology regarding revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome is characterized by a split in the means of coercion and creation of a state of 'multiple sovereigns'.

28. See Neni Panourgia's review for the *Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*, criticizing the quantification of civil wars and the ethnographic method (inherently different cases and incomparable) and the little amount of time spent in the field.

REFERENCES

- Balcells, L. and S.N. Kalyvas. (2014). Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 58(8), pp.1390-1418. DOI:10.1177/0022002714547903
- Brown, M.E. (1996). *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*. Massachusetts: MIT Press
- Brown, M.E. (1997). *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*. Massachusetts: MIT Press
- Brown, M.E. (2011). *Do Democracies Win Their Wars?* Massachusetts: MIT Press
- Chandra, B. (1989). *India's Struggle for Independence, 1857-1947*. India: Penguin Books India
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56(4), pp. 563–95. DOI:10.1093/oep/gpf064
- Cooper, F. (1994). *Conflict and Connection: Rethinking Colonial African History*. The American Historical Review, 99 (5), pp. 1516–45. DOI:10.2307/2168387
- Fearon, J.D. (2004). Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(3), pp. 275–301. DOI:10.1177/0022343304043770
- Fearon, J.D. (2007). Iraq's Civil War. *Foreign Affairs*, 86(2), pp. 2–15
- Fearon, J.D. and D. D. Laitin. (2003). Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1), pp. 75–90
- Fearon, J.D. (2011). Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War. *World Development, Ethnicity and Ethnic Strife*, 39(2), pp. 199–211. DOI:10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.11.031
- Frank, A.G. (1966). *The Development of Underdevelopment*. Boston: New England Free Press
- Horowitz, D.L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. California Berkeley: University of California Press
- Huntington, S.P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster
- Kalyvas, S.N. (2007). Civil Wars. In Susan Stokes and Carles Boix (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, (pp. 416-35). Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Kalyvas, S.N. (2006). *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Kalyvas, S.N., I. Shapiro, and T. Masoud. (2008). *Order, Conflict, and Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Keen, D. (2000). Incentives and Disincentives for Violence. In Mats R. Berdal

- and David Malone (Eds.), *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, (pp. 19-43). Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Laitin, David D. (1986). *Hegemony and Culture: Politics and Change Among the Yoruba*. University of Chicago Press.
- Laitin, David D. (2007). *Nations, States, and Violence*. OUP Oxford.
- Montalvo, J.G., and M. Reynal-Querol. (2005). *Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict and Civil Wars*. Barcelona: The World Bank Universitat Pompeu Fabra
- Neuman, W.L. (2007). *Basics of Social Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. New Jersey: Pearson/Allyn and Bacon
- Panourgia, N. (2008). Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars. Politics and History: How to Deal with Tormented Pasts*. *Cultural and Intellectual History Society*, 8(1), pp. 192-196
- Sambanis, N. (2002). A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 13(3), pp. 215-43. DOI:10.1080/10242690210976
- Sambanis, N. (2004). Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War. *Perspectives on Politics*, 2(2), pp. 259-79. DOI:10.1017/S1537592704040149
- Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolution*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Thaler, K.M. (2012). Ideology and Violence in Civil Wars: Theory and Evidence from Mozambique and Angola. *Civil Wars*, 14(04), pp. 546-67
- Tilly, C. and S. Tarrow. (2006). *Contentious Politics*. Boulder: Paradigm Press