THE MIGRATION-INTERSTATE CONFLICT NEXUS

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ABSTRACT

When and how does forced migration strain security relations between neighbouring States? Drawing from secondary research on two interstate conflicts in Africa's Great Lakes Region during the 1970s and 1990s, I examine the socio-political conditions in both the migrants' home and recipient States that interweave migrants into both States' security calculations. I argue that refugees strain neighbouring States' security relations under conditions of domestic socio-political violence, geographical proximity, and opportunities for refugees' forced-return mobilisation. Evidence from the 1978-79 Uganda-Tanzania war, and the post-1994 DRC-Rwanda conflict, indicates that given these conditions forced migration strains interstate security relations by arousing suspicion and fear of migrants living in neighbouring States among leaders of refugees' home country; and provoking migrants' desire to forcefully return home expressed through politico-military mobilisation and declaration of war. Sending States pressure host States to 'contain' refugees' mobilisation for forceful return. When recipient States are unable or unwilling to satisfy sending States' demands, refugees become infused in both countries' security calculations. These convergent processes generate interstate conflicts and may result in armed confrontation. The findings are useful for grasping the transformation of civil wars into transnational and regional conflicts, such as prevailed in the Region since the 1990s.

Key Words: Forced Migration, Inter-State Conflict, Great Lakes Region, Uganda-Tanzania War, Rwanda-DRC Wars

INTRODUCTION

Africa's Great Lakes Region (GLR) has experienced various transnational armed

conflicts originating in domestic causes. Since the 1990s, these conflicts quickly transform from civil wars to complex regional security concerns involving strained interstate security relations (Khadiagala 2006). One major causal force behind this evolving insecurity and the metamorphosis from civil to interstate

conflicts has been the phenomenon of forced migration and conflict refugees, which, though appreciated in the literature on refugees-related conflicts (Mushemeza 2007; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), remains less well analysed through comparative lenses on interstate conflicts in the Region. In this paper, I show that forced migration strains security relations between the sending and recipient States when it generates suspicions and fears of migrants among leaders in refugees' home country; and when migrants mobilise and seek to return forcefully. When sending States pressure host States to contain migrants' activities, refugees become infused in both countries' security calculations vis-a-vis each other. This infusion of refugees into neighbouring states' security calculations against each other may reach a point of interstate confrontation. To grasp the migration-interstate conflict nexus, tracing politico-security causes of interstate conflicts from both sending and recipient States is important because not all countries feel their refugees in neighbouring countries threaten home security. To explain when leaders in sending States are likely to link their national security with their refugees I consider socio-political, geo-political, and host-country conditions that generate this fear. Socio-political violence in sending States results in one group's forced exile. Geographical proximity allows extruded groups to settle in neighbouring countries. Opportunities for refugees' mobilisation for return, in the host country, strengthen their desire to return forcefully. The resulting fears and suspicions among sending States' leaders; and refugees' actual mobilisation for forceful return, strain neighbours'

security relations. The two processes infuse refugees in neighbouring states' security calculations, transforming a hitherto refugee-generating civil conflict into a transnational and interstate one.

This argument supplements studies that examine the securitisation of migration in the age of globalisation. Shain and Barth examine the foreign policy implications of migration, focusing on the role of Jewish and Armenian Diasporas through a theoretical nexus between constructivism and liberalism. They argue that a combination of migrants' identities and domestic political interactions affect States' foreign policies (Shain & Barth 2003). While Shain and Barth do not study security, they highlight the possible influence of migrants upon the home State given the strength of the State at home. Similarly, Mushemeza studies the influence of Rwandan refugees in the GLR. He concludes that with limited integration in host societies, refugees with strong home attachment look for opportunities for forceful return (Mushemeza 2007). Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) demonstrate why and how refugees are mechanisms through which civil conflicts transnationalise. Boswell's (2007) analysis of the "securitization of migration" in Europe indicates that migration affects States' security calculations, though he places emphasis on host-country security. I supplement these analyses with a critical examination of the nexus between migration and the security relations of both the sending and receiving States. This links migration and security in a State-centric global landscape. While scholars investigate migrants' links with domestic societies, they place emphasis

on migrants' socio-economic impact (Poros 2001), identity issues (Soysal 1994), and its link with other forms of transnationalism (Vertovec 2003). By interrogating the causal influence of forced migration on interstate security relations, I underscore the geopolitical imperatives of forced migration, the intellectual link between Migration Studies and International Security, as well as African Studies, hence bringing these related sub-disciplinary strands into conversation.

This is a State-centric study in which forced migration implies traumatic socio-political extrusion from the home country resulting from socio-political and/or economic persecution (Ho 2012) as distinct from natural-disaster-induced migration. Strained interstate security relations include accusations and counter-accusations that may result in armed conflict between sending and recipient neighbouring States. This security concern arises from home-country leaders' fears of, and about, refugees' activities in the host country, and refugees' desire to return home forcefully expressed through mobilisation or support for armed conflict. For these processes to strain States' security relations, certain conditions must prevail: domestic political violence, which initially leads to forced migration; geographical proximity, which allows refugees to live in their home-country's neighbourhood; and the host country's inability or unwillingness to repatriate or relocate these migrants. These conditions generate and exacerbate fears and suspicions from migrants' home country, while amplifying migrants' desire to return. To illustrate these mechanisms,

I review literature on studies of two interstate conflicts from Africa's GLR: the 1978-79 Tanzania-Uganda war; and the post-1994 security relations between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. These cases are useful: they reveal the transformation of civil conflicts to international conflicts, differences in states' responses to actual or perceived threats from their refugees based in neighbouring states, and the similarity of resulting interstate relations regardless of when, who is in power, and where these refugees are based.

The difference between these conflicts is that where the Tanzania-Uganda conflict followed the 1971 coup de'tat, the Rwanda-DRC conflict followed the 1994 genocide. Where the Uganda-Tanzania conflict took several years to break out, the Rwanda-DRC war took only one year. While the Uganda-Tanzania war lasted a short period resulting in the overthrow of Amin, the Rwanda-DRC conflicts have raged on even after Mobutu's downfall and Kabila Sr's assassination. The DRC had apparently failed to contain mobilising and re-arming Rwandan refugees as Mobutu had supported the fallen government in Kigal against the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A), just as Nyerere had disapproved of Amin's coup. However, both conflicts followed forced migration resulting from intrastate political crises. Regardless of differences in leaderships of these countries and the causes of the initial refugee-producing conflicts, forced migrants led to interstate conflicts, hence making forced migration the major causal factor in these conflicts.

Ironically, scholars tend to address these conflicts as contextually unrelated, yet they have commonalities on the

independent variable: forced migration. Because I sample on the independent variable, I emphasize the causal process through which refugee status and activities lead to the dependent variable: strained interstate security relations. The two conflicts might differ in their contexts–post-1994 genocide in the DRC-Rwanda relations; and the post-1971 Uganda coup in the Tanzania-Uganda conflict. There were different leaderships in Zaire and Tanzania. And they occurred at different times. But both cases constitute some unique experiences in the GLR's security complexes that have refugees at their core. I bring them in a single analytical framework. Therefore, this is less an explanation of inter-state insecurity, stressed in analyses of the incompatibility of states' interests and preferences (Levi 1960; Levy 1998), and more of a demonstration of when and how forced migration strains states' security relations.

The paper proceeds as follows: the first section summarises the literature on migration in the age of global interconnectedness before focusing on securitised migration. Then follows a theoretical outline of the conditions under which force migration may strain inter-state security relations. I also develop a causal mechanism showing theoretically how this occurs. The empirical section demonstrates how each of the two mechanisms led to conflicts in both cases. The conclusion draws implications for further research and policy.

MIGRATION AND SECURITY

Globalisation, Migration, and Security

Analyses of contemporary migration emphasize the influence of migrant communities on States' responses through migration policy and domestic security. In the age of globalisation and open borders, State policies must accommodate migration pressures. Contemporary states exist in a globalised landscape wherein territorial control, according to this view, is limited by increasing linkages and interdependence. This allows people to migrate more than was previously possible–say during slave trade and pre-World War periods (Zeleza 2005). Thus, globalisation–ease of transport, communication, networking, transnational business and social actors linkages, connections between the local and the global–"undermines the salience of national sovereignty and citizenship", and creates "deterritorialised and post-national communities as an alternative to territorially-bounded national polities" (Baubock 2003, p.701). Through migration, these communities link the local and the global, the rural and the urban, the peripheral and the core. This calls for the redefinition of identities, influence, and communities whose global existence transcends the State-centric territorial and security space (Levitt et al 2003; Vertovec 2003; International Newsletter on Migration, 2004). By forcing States to open their borders, globalisation pressures create "Migration State", a state whose borders are open to migratory pressures and whose population, domestic, and border security policies must accommodate these pressures (Hollifield 2004).

From the foregoing, migration affects the nation-state in three ways. First, it forces the State to adjust its migration policies to the changing realities as States' security controls within their territorial confines are continually subjected to migrants' influences and pressures. Second, States must contend with migration's consequences, especially its internal and external security dimensions. As States open their borders, they receive and send out migrants that may or may not lose their home-identity and attachment. Migrants, then, become national citizens with global presence. Third, while states are concerned about immigrants, others may provide preferential treatment to immigrants on ethnic (Ho 2012) and political grounds, while also responding to international normative expectations to protect forced migrants (e.g. UNHCR 1951). This is especially so if the State is a signatory to, and respects, international refugee instruments. However, when first-generation migrants identify themselves with their home State one can say that migration opens up the State without erasing it given the salience of state-centric citizenship identity. As a super-structural social arrangement to which "persons owe exclusive loyalties of citizenship and identity" (Baubock 2003, p.700), the State becomes a beneficiary, victim, or definer of migrants' identities depending on the context. The State contends with migrants' security dimension, including accommodating the resource-based pressures these "returnees" create (Ho 2012). Refugees' security dimension, then, combines the politico-security and socio-economic pressures they create, their state-based citizenship, and identities. These identities have persisted, in some instances solidified, regardless of globalisation's tendency to mute some. It follows from the foregoing that differences in causes and circumstances of migration across time and space explain differences in how States perceive of and receive return migrants. Here lies the notion of securitised migration.

Securitisation of Migration

Securitised migration has three dimensions: domestic concerns about the activities of migrant communities; the security implications of migrants' existence in host and sending States; and the extension of sending States' security concerns to States hosting their refugees. Domestic security concerns depend on the way migrants left the country and these migrants' perceptions about the home government. Forced migrants are likely to politically affect the home country, for they signify intergroup conflicts: one group displaces the other and fears the latter's solidification in exile; the displaced group feels the urge to return home especially when memories of extrusion are still strong. Voluntary migrants may not raise these concerns. When forced migrants blame the ruling government for their extrusion their resentment may propagate international criticism against it. They may work toward its downfall through elections and diasporic funding for the opposition or by mobilising and creating transnational politics as well as funding armed conflicts at home (International Crisis Group 2010; Brun & Nicholas Van Hear 2012; Koinova 2011; Lum et al 2013).

The demands and pressures, which affect both sending and host States, are important for understanding the

securitisation of refugees. Lum et al argue that "under certain circumstances, diaspora groups pose a risk to intrastate security by increasing the probability of civil war" (Lum et al 2008, p.201). Mushemeza argues that Rwandan refugees integrated to their host communities to acquire the political, security, economic and other skills and resources necessary for a return home movement (Mushemeza 2007). By forming return-home movements, they became a security threat to their home country. Refugees may also affect their host countries' security when they involve in resource and power struggles with natives of host countries. This creates insecurity for the migrants themselves and their host society given the survival struggles between both groups. Mamadani's (1998) analysis of "the Kivu Crisis" in the DRC is informative of this complex process in Kinyarwanda-speaking communities in Eastern DRC, which faced identity-based insecurity for many years. Insecurity may also arise when some migrants involve in criminal and/or terrorist acts (Boswell 2007; Waldmann 2010). From this perspective, securitised migrants affect host States domestically by conflicting with indigenes and internationally as refugees. The resulting international security concerns and human vulnerability affect the State in important ways (Newman and van Selm 2003; Ho 2012).

The sending State's security concerns become intertwined with the host State's generosity: for instance, forced migrants may mobilise for and take part in anti-home-government activities like civil wars. Such wars become deterritorialised due to the involvement of diasporic finances and mobilisation against their home governments: the front is both local and diasporic (Brun & Van Hear 2012). Though diasporas may promote peace through mediation, peace building, mobilising resources, lobbying governments and international organisations (Baser and Ashok Swain 2008; Lum et al 2008, p.201), refugees can also become key actors in the spread of civil wars. I agree with Salehyan and Gleditsch that forced migrations are a key mechanism through which conflicts spread across regions. While refugees are victims of domestic turmoil, argue Salehyan and Gleditsch, they "increase the risk of subsequent conflict in host and origin countries" by creating "rebels without borders" (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2009, p.145-164). This internationalisation of civil conflicts provides ample evidence of the international security dimension of forced migration.

However, these analyses require supplementary reflections on the conditions under which migration is securitised and how it affects interstate security relations. Within our "borderless world" (Hiebert 2003), there are political conditions under which refugees create security concerns, absent which they hardly could. These conditions and activities create "overlapping memberships between territorially separated and independent polities" (Baubok 2003, p.700). Extrusion combines with ethnic geopolitics and existential conditions that link "the local and the diasporic", breeding interstate conflicts (Brun and van Hear 2012). Investigating the link between forced migration and international security is a

response to Baubock's call for empirical studies on migrant transnationalism. Baubock avers that the political activities in which migrants engage affect their self-definition, collective identities, and conceptions of citizenship among sending and host societies. This in turn affects relations between both countries. By demonstrating how these activities affect these States' security relations, I underline refugees' influence on security relations between geopolitically contiguous States.

MIGRATION AND INTERSTATE SECURITY RELATIONS

Under what conditions do forced migrations strain relations between the sending and the recipient State? How do these causal relations obtain? Answers to these questions help us to appreciate differential consequences of migration on interstate security relations and to distinguish "refugees" from "returnees" in terms of migrants' relationship to sending and recipient States' policies (Hein 1993; Ho 2012). It helps us to explain why some sending States conflict with some, and not all of their refugees' host states. This requires a good grasp of background conditions in both sending and recipient States that give causal import to forced migration. Since it is difficult to find a country whose emigrants live only in its neighbourhood, "transnational" and "international" migration are undistinguishable here because of the linkages between emigrants living in neighbouring countries and those living in distant lands. While those living in neighbouring countries have geographical proximity, those spread across the globe facilitate those

living across the border as the Uganda-Tanzania war demonstrated (Mukasa Mutiibwa 1992, p.125-6). Therefore, the migration is "transnational", the relations "interstate". This does not conceptually conflate the "international", and the "transnational". Instead, it shows them as complementary realities in a complex migration-security nexus.

Likewise, domestic conditions generate cross-border and transnational migration. However, once the migration has occurred it acquires causal import of its own. Herein lies the value of calling attention to the *nature and causes of migration*: for instance, civil conflict's physical threat and social consequences affect people's choices to flee (Adhikari 2012), but the way both forced migrants and States perceive and respond to this fleeing affects States' security calculations in ways that transcend the original cause of migration. For example, when a neighbouring State provides sanctuary for refugees organising to forcefully return home the resulting trans-territorial conflict (Salehyan 2007) affects both the sending and host States. No longer does what caused the original migration matter; migration itself acquires causal influence. This demonstrates the importance of background conditions in the migration-security analysis.

Background Conditions

Not all instances of forced exile strain interstate security relations. Some forced exiles are received, settled, integrated as "returnees", receiving preferential treatment contrary to "repatriation" and management of "refugees" associated with forced migration literature (Ho 2012). Other exiles raise security concerns

as soon as they emigrate (Mushemeza 2007). So, when is forced migration problematic for States' security relations? I argue that three conditions must prevail. First, domestic political violence that leads to *forced migration* indicates severe intergroup conflicts. Second, geographical proximity makes some of the migrants to raise security concerns in the home country. Third, opportunities for migrants' mobilisation to return home are vital. These conditions are necessary but not sufficient to influence interstate security relations: they are also necessary for they create fertile ground for exiles/refugees to enter States' security calculations. Not all refugees are securitised: for instance, refugees born of natural disasters have different existential and political constraints from politically extruded migrants. Some forced exiles may appeal to extra territorial kinship ties or ethnic affinity, leading to quick integration. Others may not (Brubaker 1998).

Political violence may take the form of revolution, State repression, or ethno-political conflicts. A revolution disrupts the existing socio-political order, resulting in some groups ethnically dominating the political and socio-economic landscape. Revolutionary violence threatens the target group, leading to extrusion. State repression may involve a dictator purging members of the society, especially personnel in security services, to reduce domestic opposition and threats to the regime. Coups, purges, and counter-coups typify such repressive regimes (Mazrui 1975; Horowitz 1985; Omara-Otunnu 1987; Prunier 2009a). This creates fear among the persecuted and other opposition groups, forcing

them to exile. Ethno-political conflicts may also result from ethno-racial or religious identities, whereby one group forces another into exile owing to ethnic persecution as has happened in the GLR (Prunier 2009a and b).

Likewise, some domestic conflicts have ethno-racial and religious dimensions. These degenerate into insurgencies with ethno-political undertones because of accumulated conflicts and conflict spirals (Fearon and Laitin 2003). States may also ethnicise their counter-insurgency responses, as did Sudan over the years leading to refugees (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008). When refugees cannot integrate in the host society, or when there is limited ethnic homogeneity within the host state, they have strong desire to return, and may mobilise to do so forcefully. If both countries cannot agree on how to manage these refugees' repatriation–for reasons ranging from historically-divergent interests to personal conflicts between state leaders and to geostrategic interests or interference in neighbouring states' domestic politics–leaders in the sending State become worried about their security. These fears intensify as refugees mobilise to invade their home country. When the sending State seeks to counter this perceived, potential, or actual mobilisation from within the host State's territory it threatens the host State's sovereignty. This situation characterised Sudan-Uganda relations since 1991: Uganda's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)'s original founders sought refuge in southern Sudan in 1986. When they received Sudanese support, Uganda retaliated in 1993 by supporting John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) against

Sudan. Both rebel groups had refuge in the sponsoring country. Forced exile defined security relations between these neighbours (Prunier 1994) as it did in the GLR during the 1990s.

Neighbourhood implies geographical proximity and always entails ethnic geopolitics for countries with transnational ethnicities. Refugees who live in neighbouring countries are more problematic for the home country's security concerns than those who migrate to distant destinations: given *desire* and *opportunities* they can easily attack the homeland from across the border. True: migrants who are more distant may provide financial, mobilisational, ideational and political resources for return-home movements (Baser & Swain 2008, p.7). However, distance from home forces them to rely on indirect means like international pressure on home countries. When an armed struggle breaks out, more distant refugees rely on their compatriots in neighbouring States or within the home country's territory for active combat. Refugees living in neighbouring countries are near enough to monitor conditions at home, and to recruit fighters from home where necessary. Proximity becomes a motivator. However, this arises from "opportunities for mobilisation" in the host country.

Opportunities for mobilisation are facilitating conditions, resources, and technologies, which enable refugees who are intent on mobilising for a forceful return to do so without, or with limited, hindrances from the host State and society. Such opportunities may exist beyond the host State and society, but those accruing within the host society are more effective than those

obtaining from outside the mobilising groups' current residence/location. I identify three kinds of *opportunities* for *mobilisation* among migrants: the host State's limited control over its domestic domain; conflicts in the host society and beyond; and support from the host State. Weak States allow rebel groups fighting against neighbouring countries, criminal networks, and terrorists, to use their peripheral regions. They can become "sanctuaries" for rebel movements (Salehyan 2007; Piazza 2008), allowing them access to uncontrolled resources necessary for war. Conflict onset and prolongation are more likely when the conflict is located in resource-rich areas (Lujala 2010). Similarly, limited domestic control gives refugees the opportunity to find operational ground, hence enhancing their maneuverability for violent return. In addition, when there are conflicts in the host State, refugees/exiles participate in these conflicts as a preparatory measure for their subsequent return home through, say, integration into security services, and taking sides with one of the conflicting groups to acquire training, experience, and networks necessary for their planned return.

Integration of refugees in the host State's security services may also complicate the host State's political and security landscape. Indigenous peoples may resist migrants' influence in security circles, as well as their socio-economic and political influence. Yet participation in the host country's security crises, partaking of its political and socio-economic space gives refugees resources, knowledge, and skills in the management of violence, political maneuverings, diplomacy, resources, technologies, and networks, which make

them more demanding against their home government. This further renders compromise between refugees and their home government difficult, as armed, experienced, networked and organised refugees acquire greater bargaining leverage, when compared to refugees without such opportunities. This may force the host State to support refugees when they decide to return home to rid itself of non-citizens who can potentially cause domestic conflicts. If their home country is unwilling, for whichever reasons, to peacefully receive its refugees, the host country has limited choices besides supporting refugees' armed struggle against their country, as happened in Uganda-Rwanda relations (Mushemeza 2007).

Causal Relationship: From Migration to Interstate Security Relations

The foregoing clarifies that refugees can strain interstate security relations. I derive the causal mechanism from analysing *government concerns* in the home country and *desire* among refugees themselves. This is important because not all countries with refugees in neighbouring countries fear that those refugees threaten their home country's national security. This helps to delineate countries that securitise their refugees and those that do not. Second, I emphasize refugees' desire to return. This is distinct from ethnic returnees who may be positively received by the host State and integrated (Ho 2012) and those without desire and opportunity to return home *forcefully*. This implies two causal processes from both sending and host States: fears and suspicions among leaders of the sending State; and refugees' desire to return home expressed through mobilisation for armed engagement with the home government (Figure 1).

### Figure 1: Domestic Suspicion, Migrants' Desire, and Interstate Conflict

Figure 1 indicates that *suspicion at home* and migrants' *desire to return home* work in opposite directions but in a complementary manner. They affect inter-state security relations (either conflict or cooperation in security affairs related to these refugees) from opposite directions because the causal forces come from both the sending and recipient country. These two causal processes are more important than other factors that we may consider to affect the migration-interstate security relationship because the processes directly combine the agency of main actors: the sending State, the recipient State, and migrants themselves. The meeting point between home-based fear and suspicion, and migrants' desire to return home, is a state of either interstate conflict or peaceful relations depending on whether States agree to address, jointly, the challenge

they both face as a result of the earlier forced migration.

Suspicion, Fear at home

When refugees flee to a neighbouring country, the immediate concerns for leaders in the home country are the settlement, demobilisation, repatriation if at all, weakening their intent to forcefully return, disarmament of armed ones, and possibly relocation to distant places to preclude their threat to home security. This suspicion arises from leaders' concern that these refugees may forge alliances with their remaining kin

and kith and other domestic opposition groups to mobilise against especially the new socio-political order. Here I consider forced exile resulting from socio-political displacement of one [racio-ethnic, religious or ideological] group by another. Evidence of suspicions and fears consists in home governments' rhetoric and their interests expressed through domestic politico-security actions.

The home country may also suspect– even fear–that the host State may support such groups in case of previously strained relations. Here, the sending State has several choices. First, it may appeal to the host State to demobilise, disarm, or relocate refugees. For various reasons, say the host State's international refugee obligations, level of domestic control, the transnational ethnicity of neighbouring States, and degree of cooperation between the new regime and the host country, the host State may have difficulty meeting the sending country's demands. We can measure variations in these State-related conditions, but I place emphasis on whether or not the host State finally satisfies the sending State's demands.

Other factors constant, a higher likelihood that the host country will meet the sending State's demands reduces the likelihood of suspicions from the latter. In consequence, there will be less strain on security relations between them. Contrarily, if the host State remains uncooperative or fails to meet these demands, the sending State's suspicions may degenerate into fear. The issue, then, becomes deeply engrained in the sending State's security calculations vis-à-vis the host State (The Independent 2009)[1].

The fear is that refugees are too near to be ignored, for they can easily access home citizens and state structures. This resonates with arguments about the relationship between proximity and armed conflict or cooperation (Robst et al 2007; Buhaug and Scott Gates 2002). The geopolitical dimension, however, works concurrently with forced migrants' strong desire to return home.

Desire to Return Home

Most refugees desire to return home. Yet, some may fear that return is dangerous depending on their distinctive circumstances and the way the host State received them. Among those desirous of returning, some believe in, and have motives for, forceful return. Motives being difficult to measure, I determine the desire to return home by considering mobilisation for armed attack, justifications for such mobilisation, and actual armed attacks against their home country. The longevity of mobilisation is unimportant here: it depends on opportunities like personnel, and conditions in, and support from, the host State. Mobilisation may involve the formation of organisations/associations

as well as political and military wings to meet refugees' politico-military objectives. Therefore, refugees show their desire to return home forcefully by mobilising politically and militarily, and by attacking the home country.

Refugees' "desire" involves dichotomous variation. Either there is strong desire among a considerable section of migrants, who then constitute the necessary leadership and mobilise others; or there is none and the migrants remain without leadership and un-mobilised. The experience of forced migration, the pains previously inflicted upon them, and the victors' fear of the return of violently extruded peoples, hampers possibilities of negotiating peaceful return. Both groups have developed moralistic and dependable affects and intra-group expectations within themselves and against the other group. They have enhanced intra-group cohesion while widening inter-group biases regarding power, threat, and conflict. This hampers negotiated settlement of the dispute between refugees and the ruling group, and erodes the latter's respect for the plight of exiles. Both groups have reservations dealing with each other, having developed negative perceptions and feelings of injustice and betrayal. Amity between such groups remains elusive (Ascher 1986; Rouhana and Fiske 1995). More so when there are ethnic undertones, in agreement with analyses that underscore the difficulty of peacefully resolving ethnic conflicts without external involvement (Walter 1999; Downes 2007). Given these deep-seated ill feelings, forced migrants believe they can only return forcefully.

The home groups, conversely, believe the only way to secure themselves and protect their hard-won socio-political and economic space is to keep their enemies outside. However, because the extruded groups live in a neighbouring country, the latter joins the home-country's security calculations. Simultaneously the host country considers how its relations with the sending country can be normalised post-the violent extrusion. Diplomatic settlement of this dispute, as already noted, is affected by the ease with which the host State can accommodate demands from the sending State, the ease with which the host State can keep these migrants under strict, tight control, and relations between the two States' governments.

The above conditions may not be easy to combine on the positive in developing societies. Even western societies were unable to prevent Tamil refugees from supporting the civil war in Sri Lanka for reasons of domestic politics, limited understanding of the complex dynamics of the war, and the sheer immensity and influence of disaporic mobilisation (Brun & Van Hear 2012). Thus, when the migrants' desire exceeds the host country's ability or willingness to control, the alternative may be to support their return as Uganda did in 1990 against Rwanda[2]. This draws the host country into a conflict with its neighbour. When there are no strained relations the two countries may work together to reduce the group's mobilisation and possibly attack against the home government, thereby maintaining interstate amity. Likewise, besides strained relations, the country may not easily support these groups to return home forcefully unless

they demonstrate this desire through leadership and organisation. This relates to the notion that the level of organisation is one of the major conditions for foreign support to armed conflicts (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011). Refugees must demonstrate the desire to return home. Otherwise, they may not threaten the sending State's security or acquire support from the host State even if these States' relations are unfriendly. This relational logic shows interstate security relations as influenced by causal forces from opposite directions/sources. Evidence from two seemingly unrelated cases of inter-state conflicts in Africa's GLR proves this hypothesis.

EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA'S GREAT LAKES REGION

In Africa's GLR, two interstate conflicts are helpful for empirically demonstrating the above-theorised migration-interstate conflict nexus: the 1978-9 Tanzania-Uganda war and the post-1994 DRC-Rwanda relations. Both conflicts involved home-based fear of migrants; and migrants' mobilisation to return home. While one conflict followed a coup d'état, another followed a genocide. Both were rooted in domestic political crises, and followed from forced migrants who exhibited readiness to mobilise and attack their home countries—to ensure forceful return from host neighbouring countries.

A) The Tanzania-Uganda Conflict, 1978-79

In Uganda, Idi Amin overthrew President Milton Obote in a coup d'état in January 1971. Obote and several other Ugandans fled to neighbouring Tanzania and

beyond. They mobilised to return home, forming various anti-Amin armed groups. At home, Amin also feared political and military elites whom he suspected of cooperating with these exiles. As he purged the Langi and Acholi ethnic groups in the armed forces who had not only dominated Uganda's military and other security services since colonialism, but more so because the Langi were Obote's co-ethnics, he forced many to flee the country, creating more refugees. With Tanzania unwilling to extrude the refugees, this strained relations between the two countries, leading to war in 1978.

This war is interesting in two ways. First, since Idi Amin's ascension to power Tanzania's president, *Mwalimu* Julius Kambarage Nyerere, had disapproved of Amin's coup d'état. Many Ugandans had fled to exile in Tanzania and other countries. However, the two countries continued cooperating especially within the ambit of the East African Community (EAC) instead of declaring open hostility right from the start. Second, a group of exiles led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, formed the Front for National Salvation (FRONASA) and attacked Uganda in 1972. They were repulsed and fled back to Tanzania. However, this did not lead to open confrontation between the two countries though Amin knew these groups' activities in Tanzania.

Amin's Suspicions, Fears

As Amin's fears increased, he sought to eliminate domestic opposition that could potentially ally with the Tanzania-based groups. He undertook ethnic balancing approaches, which endangered all Ugandans but especially two Luo sub-ethnic groups, many of whose members

were already in exile: the Acholi who had dominated the military since colonialism; and the Langi, Obote's co-ethnics (Mazrui 1975; Rwengabo 2013).Claiming that the Acholi and the Langi, "had plotted to disarm all other soldiers, and to assert a complete ethnic monopoly of military power in Uganda", Amin killed "thousands of Langi and Acholi" (Mazrui 1976, p.261; Rwengabo 2013) in one of Africa's worst military purges.

Amin established two notorious security agencies: the State Research Bureau (SRB) and Public Safety Unit (PSU). These agencies committed hundreds of thousands of extrajudicial killings (Mazrui 1975, p.297-312), forcing more Ugandans into exile. This reign of terror had two countervailing consequences. First, it increased insecurity for his potential and actual opponents, forcing more of them into exile. This increased numbers of refugees whose numerical and mobilisational capacity increased Amin's security fears. Second, Amin was concerned with Tanzania where most refugees were mobilising militarily to invade from. He asked Tanzania to chase them away in vain. Forced migration had created a transnational anti-regime force that strained relations between these neighbouring countries. As Amin's domestic policies created more insecurity and exiled more Ugandans, worldwide anti-Amin sentiment widened and deepened. This heightened the exiles' politico-military mobilisation and vigilance when they realised that Amin had lost international reputation.

Migrants' Desire, Politico-Military Mobilisation, Attack

Ugandan exiles mobilised in two ways. First, they formed military groups that would confront Amin. For instance, Museveni's FRONASA, after the 1972 repulsion, continued to secretly recruit and train young Ugandans and Rwandan refugees living in the Region since the 1959 Rwandan social revolution. One of them was Fred Rwingyema who later led the invasion of Rwanda in 1990. This increased their military capacity for war. Apart from FRONASA, Akena p'Ojok, William Omaria and Ateker Ejalu, led the Save Uganda Movement, while Andrew Lutakoome Kayiira commanded the Uganda Freedom Movement. Second, ugandan refugees mobilised exiled military officers and men. For instance, Col David Oyite-Ojok and Brig Tito Okello remained under Obote's leadership. They later commanded the *Kikosi Maalum* (Special Force) of Obote's Uganda National Liberation Movement/Army (UNLM/A) when they attacked Amin in 1978. Col. Zed Maruru, Amin's exiled former Air force commander, was also instrumental in commanding the UNLA's invasion of Uganda.

These various anti-Amin military groups received morale from Tanzania. Aware of their potential for invasion, Amin pre-emptively attacked Tanzania under the guise of territorial claims (the Kagera Salient) on 9 October 1978. Possibly his real objective was to rally the people at home around the flag, neutralise domestic opposition, and/or turn Tanzania's territory into a buffer zone/fighting-ground with these groups. Why? Because domestic support had dwindled. Factions in the military were severe. Amin's life itself was

endangered: there were more than seven coup and assassination attempts against him between 1972 and 1977 (Morrison et al 1984, p.673-74; Omara-Otunnu 1987). Given these conditions refugees could easily link up with domestic opponents. It was judicious for Amin to externalise the problem. Amin's son, Jaffar Amin, has hinted at the links between domestic and foreign opposition. He indicates that though Tanzania-Uganda relations were not cordial, "dad and his senior officers were given false and misleading reports by saboteurs and subversive elements operating within the SRB in order to start a war between Uganda and Tanzania so that dad could be overthrown" (Amin 2013).

From the foregoing, open armed confrontation between Uganda and Tanzania followed, and was rooted in, Ugandan exiles who had organised militarily and clandestinely to fight Amin. Tanzania counter-intervened in support of these anti-Amin groups (Umozurike and Umozurike 1982). Tanzania might only have repulsed Amin's forces from its territory and defended its borders. However, Tanzanian forces continued the war fighting alongside Ugandan groups until the fall of Amin. Just War theorists like Acheson-Brown might view this as "Tanzania's invasion of Uganda" and not a "counter-invasion" or counter-intervention (Acheson-Brown 2001). What is undisputable is that Ugandan exiles acquired Tanzanian support to overthrow Amin in what appeared as a war between Uganda and Tanzania. If Tanzania had withdrawn after repelling Amin's troops from the Kagera Salient, possibly the Ugandans might have been defeated and forced back to Tanzania.

Thereafter, Amin might have prepared himself for an all-out war with Tanzania. Thus, Amin's attack forced Tanzania to rally its military behind Ugandan fighters. What drove Amin to war was his fear of the many anti-Amin groups in Tanzania who were suspected to have infiltrated his security services (Amin 2013).

To further illustrate the salience of refugees' desire to return home measured in terms of mobilisation, attack, and justification for attack, consider the various groups formed: Kirunda Luwuliza and Edward Rugumayo, in Zambia, worked with Tanzania-based fighting groups. In addition to the aforementioned military groups in Tanzania, there had been formed several political groups. These included Tarsis Kabwegyere and Martin Aliker, in Nairobi, that mobilised political and military recruits from among refugees; Andrew Kayiira and Godfrey Binaisa, in the United States, offering moral, financial, and political support and mobilisation; and Sam Sabagereka, George Kanyeihamba and Paulo Muwanga, in London, who mobilised politically and internationally. Other groups emerged toward the end of Amin's regime (Mutiibwa 1992, p.125-6).

The Tanzania-based and other groups, which mobilised both politically and militarily, threatened Amin most. Tanzania's unwillingness to relocate them strained the Uganda-Tanzania security relations. As part of resolute desire, these groups later joined under the Uganda National Liberation Front/Army (UNLF/A) under Obote's political leadership, during the Moshi Conference (Morrison et al, p.674). Desire gives refugees the much-needed incentives to organise, risk war to ensure forceful

return, and to seek support from the host country and beyond. Would Tanzania have supported these groups had Amin not invaded? Yes: it had hosted them since 1971, gave them opportunites to mobilise and coalesce. Would these groups have attacked Uganda without Tanzania's military backing? Yes: they were mobilising, collecting intelligence, recruiting and training, while FRONASA had demonstrated this resolve by attacking as early as 1972.

Tanzania helped anti-Amin groups to coalesce. It offered them avenues for political and military mobilisation and training before and during the war. The key element in mobilisation was the bringing together of different political, military, human rights, and activist groups in a joint anti-Amin effort (Table 1). This resulted in a "Uganda Unity Conference", held in Moshi, Tanzania. Dr Tarsis Bazaana Kabwegyere chaired the Conference. According to Mukasa-Mutiibwa, more than twenty-five groups gathered in Moshi. From their meeting, they "emerged with what came to be called the 'Moshi Spirit'". The Conference "was convened … between 23 and 25 March 1979". Its chair, Kabwegyere, "had been elected by the various exile groups meeting in Nairobi the previous January, to be the Chairman of a consultative committee set up to liaise with Ugandan organisations fighting Amin with the view to remove Amin, establish democracy in Uganda and re-establish national independence."[3] By implication,

refugees/exiles had shown direct interest in forceful return. They had also acquired opportunities for political coalescence from Tanzania, Kenya and beyond.

Relations between Uganda and Kenya had also dwindled over time. Amin accused Kenya of being used by western powers to neocolonise Africa, and especially disintegrate the East African Community (EAC), while also stifling anti-Israeli developments in the Nile Valley that were opposed to Israeli occupation of Palestine. It is suspected that Kenya helped Israel's Mossad to spy on and prepare for the 4th July 1976 "Operation Entebbe"–a counterterroist hostage rescue mission in which Israeli commandoes raided Uganda's Entebbe International Airport–to rescue hostages of the Air France flight 139 which had been hijacked and flown to Entebbe by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine that were believed to target Israelis and other Jews on the plane (Okumu 2007, p.77-98). These strained relations provided fertile ground for anti-Amin groups to coalesce, mobilise, and hide within the breadth of East Africa, while building on their networks to confront Amin. Thus, while anti-Amin groups were more coalesced in Tanzania, refugees within and beyond Africa were all desirous of returning home, exploited available opportunities for mobilisation, and did mobilise for an anti-Amin armed conflict that drew both Tanzanai and Uganda into an interstate war.

Table 1: Anti-Amin Groups of Ugandans in Exile that Attended the Uganda Unity Conference at Moshi, Tanzania, 23-25 March 1979

Organisation	Leader	Other Known Key Members
Uganda National Movement (UNM)	Edward Rugumayo	Fred Ssempebwa, Eriya Kategaya, James Mwebaze
Negotiating Comittee for Democratic Unity - Dar es Salaam (DU-D)	Dani Wadada Nabudere	Yashpal Tandon, Omwony Ojwok, Jack Maumbe
Save Uganda Movement (SUM)	Yonasani Kanyomoozi	Johnson Eteke Ejalu, Apollo Echeku, William Okwero,
Uganda Unity Group-Lusaka (UUG)	Leander Komakech	Dr Hilary Latigo
Moshi Discussion Group (MDG)	Osinde Wangwo	Omara Aliro, Omara Atubo (Moshi Conference Organiser)
Muthaiga Discussion Group (MDG)	Mathias Ngoli	Grace Ibingira
Uganda Freedom Movement/Union (UFM),	Andrew Lutakoome-Kayiira	Olara Otunnu, John Odongkara, Joshua Luyimbazi Zake
Uganda Nationalist Organisation (UNO)	Dr Peter Magezi-Sinabulya	Israel Mayengo, Andrew Adimola, Robert Serumaga
Organisation for Uganda Refugee Services (OURS)	Semei Nyanzi	Vincent Okot
Uganda Human Rights UK (UHR)	George-William Kanyeihamba	Paul Otiti Omule, Sam Sabagereka, Paul Wangoola
Relief Educational Training - Uganda Refugees Now	Bishop Festo Kivengere	Christipher Mubiru Musoke
Free Uganda (FU)	Dr Martin Aliker	
Freedom from Oppression (FO)	Anold Bisase	Paul Kibuuka Musoke

Organisation	Leader	Other Known Key Members
Uganda National Unity and Reconciliation, Dar es Salaam (UNUR)	Eric Otema-Alimadi	Paul Milton Bonima Makmot, Ben Wacha, Fabian Odongo,
Nairobi Discussion Group (NDG).	Tarsis Bazaana Kabwegyere, PhD	Kabwegyere chaired this "Uganda Unity Conference". Other members: Oparia Ekwero., James Stepahon Aggrey Kwegir, Sam Magara, Ephraim Kamuntu,
Uganda People's Congress (UPC)	George Luwuliza-Kirunda	David Onapa Wacha, George-William Obua, Ken Oteng,
Democratic Party (DP).	Dr Paul Kawanga-Semwogerere	Anthony Ocaya
Uganda National Movement (UNM)	Akena p'Ojok	
Fund for Uganda (FfU),	Rev. Fredrick Kefa Sempangi	
Arusha Discussion Group for Diplomacy (ADG-D)	Stephen Ariko	Bill Nangai, Richard Ejotu, Ben Ogwang
Uganda Liberation Group, Zambia (ULG)	Emmanuel Aldo Oteng	Moses Apiliga, Mwa Alimadi, Dr Willy Washington Adokbongo
Council for the Liberation and Reconstruction of Uganda (CLRU)	Bernard Buzabo	John Magezi
Front for National Salvation (FRONASA)	Yoweri Kaguta Museveni	Fred Rubereeza; Jackson Senene
"Special Delegates"	Yusuf Lule and Paul Muwanga	

Organisation	Leader	Other Known Key Members
Military Leaders	Col. Tito Okello, Lt Col William Omaria, and Col. Zeddy Maruru	Maj. Chris Mudoola, Maj Smauel Manyumba, Oryema Odongkara, Capt James Odongo, Sgt Tom Oyo, Samuel Okello, Col. Toko

Source(s): This Note[4]

From Table 1, by bringing different groups to a single united front and facilitating its logistical, intelligence and territorial home, Tanzania supported these groups. However, the groups had the desire and were organised. They, however, needed to coalesce politically and militarily. After the "Unity Conference", there was a united front against Amin. Opportunities and desire intersected in a synergistic anti-Amin effort. Thus, the Uganda-Tanzania war was not a mere instance of interstate conflict; it revolved around refugees' anti-Amin struggles. It involved Amin's fear of these organising refugees, and the migrants' widespread desire and mobilisation. These factors, at a point of intersection, engendered deteriorating security relations between Uganda and Tanzania that burst into open hostilities. Ugandans' migration had been transnational: refugees were scattered beyond neighbouring countries and the Region, as were their anti-Amin groups. However, the core fighting groups, which were based in Tanzania, threatened Amin most. Likewise, Tanzania, which had not supported Amin's coup, could neither support Amin's demands for relocation of exiles nor deny refuge to fleeing Ugandans. This forced Amin to invade Tanzania in a bid to flush these groups out, mobilise domestic support, and prevent the groups from becoming strong.

Tanzania's counter-intervention would not end after repulsing Amin's forces from its territory. Instead, the exiles who had merged into UNLA after the Moshi conference, together with Tanzanian forces fought their way to the capital and beyond, overthrowing Amin and pacifying the country. Thus, while forced migrants may spread transnationally, geographical proximity is central to the mobilisation and threat-generation sufficient to strain interstate security relations. One can conclude that political violence in Uganda had led to forced migration; geographical proximity had turned migrants into a security concern for Amin's regime; and forced migrants showed their open intentions to return home, acquired the Tanzania-supported opportunities for mobilisation, and galvanised under the Moshi Spirit. The two causal processes – suspicion and fear in Uganda; and mobilisation for returning home in exile – were concurrently important in sparking off the war. We find similar realities with the Rwanda-DRC strained security relations since 1994.

B) The DRC-Rwanda Conflict since 1995

After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the genocidaires, former government soldiers, and other Rwandese fled to Zaire (now DRC). The armed men

among these refugees attacked the post-genocide government forces in 1995. Zaire was unable or unwilling to contain their operations: Mobutu had supported the fallen government in Kigali against the RPF. The increasing insecurity in Rwanda strained Zaire-Rwanda relations, leading to the 1997-2002 Congo War and future conflicts.

The 1994 genocide can be traced from the 1959 social revolution following which Rwanda's ethnic Batutsi refugees traversed the GLR. Initially Batutsi elites among these migrants organised a forceful return to Rwanda, under a rebel group called *Inyenzi* (translated "cockroaches"). They used Ugandan territory where they had settled as refugees. They formed "small, armed guerrilla groups which carried armed incursions into the border areas in Rwanda, and later into the interior. The leaderships of *Inyenzi* consisted of Tutsi elites opposed to compromise with the Hutu establishment [in Kigali], like Yeremiya Kajuga, Efraim Ruhozozo, and Kamari" (Mushemeza 2007, p.63). The *Inyenzi*, however, lacked Ugandan support after 1962/independence, as Uganda's new post-independence Obote leadership disapproved of their rebel activities using Ugandan refugee settlements and territorial spaces. The Inyenziwere were defeated in 1963. They went underground. Later, they or their remnants and descendants in exile took part in several prevailing insecurities in especially Uganda and Zaire: for instance, Fred Rwigyema and Paul Kagame were influential in anti-Amin and post-Amin Ugandan conflicts. The Inyenzi and/or their descendants later coalesced under the Rwanda Association

for National Union (RANU) in 1979. This later became the Rwandese Patriots Army/Front (RPA/F) in 1987.Rwandan refugees who had integrated in Uganda's politico-security circles founded and led the RPF. Its objective was to facilitate the return of all Rwandan refugees to Rwanda–by force if necessary (Prunier 1995, p.73). Like anti-Amin groups, Rwandan refugees exploited opportunities for mobilisation, and coalesced for forceful return. Because peaceful return remained elusive owing to the aforementioned problems– colonial legacies that entrenched ethno-political hatred among the Batutsi and Bahutu, failure of these groups' leading elites to reach compromise, and foreigners' involvement–forceful return would strain relations between Rwanda and their host countries especially Uganda.

The RPF/A invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990 after 'deserting' Uganda's NRA (National Resistance Army) in which they had been integrated since the anti-Amin struggles dating back to 1972 (Kabareebe 2014). Between 1990 and 1994, the war caused security rifts between Uganda and Rwanda, for the invaders had been refugees in Uganda, had actively participated in Uganda's security crises of 1972-1990, and had integrated in Uganda's politico-security services. But armed hostility between the two countries was confined to the RPF war for, undoubtedly, Uganda did support the RPF. Regionally, Zaire supported Rwanda against the invading RPF/A, positioning itself against Uganda. The war also caused rifts in Rwanda's political landscape (Mushemeza 2007). Some ruling elites opposed compromises with the invading Inyenzi (now renamed

Inkotanyi)'s return to Rwanda. Others argued for a negotiated settlement of the conflict and return of the invading RPA. The leadership could not agree. The conflict eluded political solutions. Meanwhile the RPA was making military gains against Rwanda's *Force Armises Rwandaise* (FAR). When President Juvenal Habyarimana was assassinated on 6 April 1994, as he returned from Arusha, Tanzania, for peace talks with the RPF/A, the country degenerated into genocide: the ethnic divide between the exiled (therefore rebelling) Batutsi and the ruling Bahutu had never been reconciled since 1959. The "myths of homeland and return" (Safran 1991) combined with home-country resistance to return caused by far the most horrible genocide in Africa. Refugees desired, mobilised to return. They had done so forcefully.

Refugee Desire, Mobilisation, and Attack

The 1994 genocide lasted about three-and-half months as the RPA made advances on the capital, Kigali. Previous victims of ethno-political conflicts, the Batutsi, displaced their earlier expellers of 1959, the Bahutu. Rwanda's Bahutu-dominated armed forces, the *Force Armises Rwandaise* (FAR), disintegrated owing to lack of effective political leadership after the president's assassination. Some officers joined the civilian genocidaires who had been mobilised and encouraged by some radical political and media elites. As the RPF cornered these actors, many fled to neighbouring Zaire, with them an estimated 1.5 million people, probably more. Former refugees were back in power; those formerly in power were now refugees.

Among those who fled were ex-FAR and party genocide-militias, commonly known as *Interahamwe* (named after the militia of Rwanda's largest political party before the genocide). Mobutu Seseseko's Zaire was too weak to disarm these refugees. With armed elements amongst refugees, more recruitment would go on and the new government of returned Batutsi in Rwanda would be destabilised (Meredith 2006).

Exploiting Zaire's weakness and unfriendly relations with the RPF, the "new refugees" regrouped and rearmed. They formed the *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda* (FDLR) and attacked Rwanda from Zaire in 1995. Because these fighters invaded from across the border as it had done after 1959, the war became interstate as had been the RPA invasion that displaced the FAR forces/government. Moreover, the Bahutu-Batutsi conflict had extended to Zaire with renewed pugnacity, creating ethnic geopolitical conflicts. This exacerbated Rwanda's fear that the FDLR would exploit conflicts in Zaire, which Mobutu had failed to contain, and continued threatening Rwanda's internal and cross border security. The FDLR might also exploit limited State control in Zaire to build strength and find external support.

Suspicions, Fears in post-1994 Rwanda

Rwanda invaded Zaire in 1996 in support of an anti-Mobutu Allied Democratic Force for the Liberation of Congo/Zaire (ADFLC). The RPF-ADFLC overthrew Mobutu and enthroned Laurent Dezire Kabila in May 1997. Kabila renamed Zaire to DRC. Rwanda, in supporting Kabila,

hoped that Kabila's new government would disarm the Rwandan refugees in Zaire. Kabila failed to satisfy Rwandan demands. Rwanda (and Uganda, which had similar security interests) sought to replace Kabila. This sparked off another war in August 1998, which lasted until Kabila's assassination in January 2001. Joseph Kabange-Kabila replaced his father and sought international assistance to end the second DRC war in 2003 (Reyntjens 2009; Prunier 2010).

While Kabila II quickly ended the official war, in which the DRC accused Rwanda and Uganda of invading the country, another war broke out in North Kivu province. Laurent Nkunda who had broken away from the Congolese forces, apparently with Rwanda's support, led the war. Nkunda, who is an ethnic Tutsi, claimed to be defending Batutsi minority in eastern DRC against Bahutu and indigenous Congolese groups. Together with Xavier Chiribanya, Col Jules Mutebutsi and other politicians supported by Rwanda, Nkunda formed the *Front de Liberation de l'Est du Congo* (FLEC). On 24 May 2004, his forces declared war in North Kivu, captured Bukavu on 30 May, killing civilians in the process (Reyntjens 2009, p.211-12). He renamed his group *Congres National pour la defense du people* (CNDP) on 30 December 2006 (Prunier 2009b, p.323). He clashed with the Pakistani-led United Nations Mission in DRC (MONUC) forces, losing about 300 fighters in November 2006 (Prunier 2009b, p.323).Though the International Criminal Court (ICC) accused Nkunda of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he was seen as Rwanda's proxy in Eastern DRC if reports of Rwanda's support are anything to go by (Reyntjens 2009,

p.214). Nkunda's operations underscore fears prevalent among Rwandophone Congolese along Tutsi-Hutu divides within the DRC, as well the transnational dimension of Rwanda's ethno-political tensions that evolved since the dawn of Belgian rule.

The DRC-Rwanda relations improved with time. Nkunda was, according to some reports, arrested in a joint operation between Rwandese and Congolese forces on 22 January 2009. This might have followed serious diplomatic engagements, international pressure on Rwanda, and the international community's involvement in the DRC. A one John-Bosco Ntaganda assumed Nkunda's leadership (Reyntjens 2009, p.6, 211-215, and 265-6). Ntaganda, also an ethnic Mututsi, reportedly originates from Rwanda. He grew up in the DRC following the 1959 forced migrations. He too reportedly received Rwandan support. Rwanda seems to use cross border ethnic proxies in the DRC to fight against anti-Rwanda groups using DRC territory. This turns eastern DRC into a buffer zone for Rwanda's ethno-political armed conflicts, while also raising Congolese internal security concerns and worries about its territorial sovereignty. When Ntaganda handed over himself to the United States Embassy in Kigali on 26 March 2013 for transfer to the ICC the war had not ended (Musavuli 2013; Arinaitwe 2013). Instead, another group, the 23 March Movement (M23), also known as the Congolese Revolutionary Army, had emerged under General Sultani Makenga and Jean-Marie Runiga Rugerero who was formerly a member of Nkunda's CNDP.

The M23 emerged in April 2012, but is in reality a continuation of the Nkunda-Ntaganda groups. Most of its members are defecting Congolese soldiers of Tutsi origin, some of whom are post-1959 Rwandan refugees or their descendants. Some like Nkunda are suspected to be part of Rwanda's proxies in the DRC that help check the activities of anti-Rwanda groups that might use Congolese territory. The group claims to pursue military interests while also fighting ethnic conflicts that had spiraled out of Rwanda in 1959 and 1994. The UN has accused Rwanda of supporting the M23, indicating that its invasion of the DRC in support of Nkunda and Ntaganda continues (UNSC 2008 and 2012). There are ongoing Uganda-chaired efforts under the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to bring peace to the DRC. Whatever the outcome of the ICGLR process, it remains undisputable that the forced migrations from Rwanda in 1959 and 1994 are the key factors that have caused these security crises over the years.

Two lessons remain important in understanding DRC-Rwanda security tensions: suspicions and fears, in Rwanda, of refugees in the DRC; and refugees' mobilisation and willingness to attack using DRC territory. In Rwanda, the new post-1994 genocide government was wary that Rwandan refugees in the DRC, among whom were armed former soldiers and radicalised militia who had executed the genocide, would mobilise and attack Rwanda. This, the refugees did. Additionally, Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government may be concerned that the Hutu-dominated refugees might use identity-based justifications to further

destabilise the country by allying with Bahutu and some disgruntled Batutsi in and outside Rwanda. Nkunda, Ntaganda, and M23 groups are said to be predominantly Tutsi; and therefore ethnically linked to the Kigali regime. Since most Rwandan refugees had fled to the DRC, it was an immediate geopolitical concern. The Zairean State was unable to disarm these refugees, allowing them to organise and attack Rwanda. They have since formed different anti-Rwanda armed groups, which continue to threaten Rwanda's security. To weaken these groups, Rwanda sought to change the Zairian leadership in 1996-1997 hoping that Kabila Sr would disarm these groups. When this failed, Rwanda got enmeshed in Congo conflicts. It ostensibly supports Tutsi-dominated armed groups as proxies against Hutu-dominated anti-Rwanda groups that operate from DRC territory. Consequently, since 1995, Rwanda has been accused of participating in conflicts in DRC (Kabila 2001; UNSC 1998, 2008, and 2013). Rwanda, in turn, accuses the DRC of allowing anti-Rwanda forces to operate from its territory, and for failure to exercise sovereign control over, and monopoly of, violence within its territory now being used by anti-RPF elements. These groups are predominantly Rwandan refugees and exiles. These accusations and counter-accusations typify the DRC-Rwanda security relations. With these suspicious relations and refugees' mobilisation, the GLR conflicts transformed "from genocide to continental war" (Prunier 2009a; Reyntjens 2009). Forced migration blighted interstate amity.

CONCLUSION

Forced migration has great potential to strain security relations especially between neighbouring States, though stakeholders in these conflicts may be transnational and global. By generating suspicions and fears from migrants' home country, migration forces sending-State actors to behave in ways that create security concerns in the host State. Likewise, migrants' struggles to forcefully return home draw the host and sending State into a complex but interlinked security situation. These findings agree with analyses which underscore the geographical dimension of armed conflicts (Robst et al 2007); studies which highlight the securitisation of migration (Boswell 2007); and International Relations scholarship which examines the domestic origins of States' international behaviour (Gordon 1974; Wood 1994; Gokacek, 2002). I have demonstrated interstate conflicts that evolve when forceful exile generates maneuvers that impact countries' security postures. This proves the view that refugees strain interstate security relations, for their relationship with the sending and host State is one of crises of belonging, accusations and counter-accusations, and of the urge to return home. By analysing security *concerns* in migrants' home country and the migrants' *desire* to return home, we are able to identify the two mechanisms by which forced migration raises fears at home while also creating return demands in the host state, hence straining security relations between neighbouring States.

This conception is helpful for distinguishing countries which conflict with their refugees' hosts from those that do not. It stresses the value of appreciating beyond-the-neighbour refugees' mobilisation, as did the various transnational anti-Amin groups. Likewise, emphasis on *desire* to return home helps us to distinguish securitised return desires from non-securitised return, and from refugees who integrate. Thus, the paper has demonstrated that suspicions and fears from migrants' home country, and migrants' desire to return home, are sufficient to alter pre-existing interstate relations. A state may not easily instrumentalise refugees to pressure a neighbour unless these forced migrants are well organised and prepared to return, forcefully where necessary. The Tanzania-Uganda war indicates that besides the non-cordial relations that existed between Nyerere and Amin, the two countries did not face-off until 1978. Even as Ugandan exiles struggled with Tanzania's 'hospitality', and as Amin became increasingly concerned with their mobilisation, armed conflict took long to break out. The refugees threatened Amin's power. And yet Tanzania could not deny them refuge partly because of Nyerere's misgivings about Amin. The Rwanda-DRC conflict is similar: Rwanda's refugees in the DRC had transformed into rebels. The post-genocide regime needed time to consolidate their power and restore order in a post-holocaust landscape. But 'refugee' attacks from Zaire forced Rwanda to respond. As former statespersons and patriots became rebels and refugees while former rebels and refugees became statespersons and patriots, the Hutu-Tutsi ethno-political tensions that had typified Rwanda's political landscape since 1957 were to define the GLR's politico-security future as the DRC war transformed into "Africa's World War"

(Prunier 2009b; Reyntjens 2009).

These findings incentivise me to make three recommendations. Conceptually and analytically, it is important to distinguish voluntary from forced migration, and thereby methodologically develop analytical frameworks for understanding differences in security behaviours of voluntary and forced migrants across time and space. This is vital for addressing both conditional and causal variables that work in combination to produce the observed intestate conflicts. Empirically, the role of forced migrants, based in non-neighbouring countries, in conflict situations involving their fellow refugees in neighbouring countries, is vital for clarifying the otherwise unclear distinction between "international" and "transnational" migrants and their influence on interstate relations. While the geopolitical dimension of migration-related interstate conflict is helpful from the viewpoint of refugee mobilisation, contemporary refugees can easily connect with one another from different countries. In fact, some leaders of armed conflicts frequently travel from their operational territory for safety, resources, and other reasons. Many have networks of supporters beyond neighbouring states. Therefore, understanding the degree to which refugees based in distant countries influence the causal and transformative dynamics of civil and transnational conflicts would be useful contribution to analyses of the migration-security nexus.

In terms of policy, the task of addressing refugee problems without raising interstate security concerns is considerable. Only when the sending State is ready to peacefully receive its refugees and

guarantee their security can the host State and the refugees themselves accept repatriation. As Walter (1999) and Downes (2007) argue, resolving some of the world's complex transnational ethnic and interstate conflicts requires determined international involvement and guarantees because of commitment problems they engender for both parties. This generalised fear partly explains why Rwandan refugees in the DRC refused to return home peacefully, further allowing war entrepreneurs among them to recruit, train, and attack Rwanda, and for Rwanda to counterattack refugee camps in the DRC. This raised the dilemma of Rwanda's self-defence and respect for the DRC's territorial integrity in line with UN and African Union (AU) conventions (AU 2000, Art 3(b); Zacher 2001). By highlighting these dilemmas and complexities of governing Africa's transnational and regional security landscape, this study should go along way in laying the foundation for foregrounding the evolution and metamorphosis of refugee-related conflicts in the GLR's changing contours of ethno-regional geopolitics (Prunier 2009a and 2010). It also provides useful insights on how to prevent and/or minimise interstate conflicts arising from transnational armed conflicts. Improvements in domestic governance by encouraging political inclusion, accommodation, and consensus democracy, might be the starting point. Developing regional regimes that protect refugees in a manner that prevents their instrumentalisation for war entrepreneurship, which might ignite interstate conflicts, or refugees' being used by some states as excuses for selfish interests that may generate

complex regional security challenges, is equally useful. This requires interstate cooperation, and in case of recalcitrance, punitive sanctioning. Finally, this analysis challenges the international community to avoid temptations of underlooking the potential for civil conflicts to transform into complex regional and global security threats not envisaged at the start of the civil conflict or of the initial forced migration (Prunier 2010). It is ironical that the international community's experts and intelligence services were either unable to envision the potential transformation of these refugee-related conflicts in the Region or that policymakers took it lightly in the face of an impending "continental catastrophe" (Prunier 2009b).

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1. For example: When Rwanda and Uganda agreed to relocate their respective political asylum seekers–Samsom Mande and Anthony Kyakabale (who had declared war against Uganda)–the two countries normalised their relations which had been strained since the conflict in Kisangani during the DRC war. See: *The Independent*, 2009 (Wednesday, 04 March), 'Renegade Col. Kyakabale on the way home?', Kampala: The Independent (http://www.independent. co.ug/reports/special-report/666-renegade-col-kyakabale-on-the-way-home, 15 May 2013); Julius Mucunguzi and Goodluck M., 2001 (30 Oct.), 'Rwanda: Kampala, Kigali Agree to Relocate Renegade Officers',

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2. James Kabarebe, 2013, 'Rwanda Invasion: Kagame breathes life into collapsing struggle', in *Daily Monitor*, Sunday, Oct. 6 2013 (accessed from http://www.monitor.co.ug/Magazines/ ThoughtIdeas/Kagame-breathes-life-into-collapsing-struggle/-/689844/2019896/-/ view/printVersion/-/gef8shz/-/index.html, 06 Oct. 2013)

3. Mutiibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 125-7

4. Abbe Kibirige Semuwemba, Online, http://semuwemba.com/category/moshi-conference-1979/ (accessed 20 May 2013). Lance Corporal (Rtd) Patrick Otto. Though this list is not verified from official sources, I find most of its content supported by official sources and scholarly works, such as: Yoweri Museveni, 1997, Sowing the Mustard Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda, Autobiography, London: Macmillan Education; S.B.K. Kasozi, 1994, The Social Origins of Violence in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers; Tarsis B Kabwegyere, 1995, The Politics of State Formation and Destruction in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers; and Mutiibwa, Uganda Since Independence, pp. 126-7

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